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Abstract 
Unemployment rates as well as income per capita differ vastly across the regions of Europe. 
Labour mobility can play a role in resolving regional disparities. This paper focuses on the 
questions why labour mobility is low in the EU and how it is possible that it remains low. We 
explore whether changes in labour participation act as an important alternative adjustment 
mechanism. We answer this question in the affirmative. Furthermore, we argue that labour 
participation of young females is very important in adjusting to regional disparities. Finally, 
we examine whether part-time work is an adjustment mechanism that is comparable to labour 
force participation. It turns out not to be. 
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1. Introduction 
The desire to establish the four freedoms belonging to the formation of a common market – 
free movement of goods, services, persons and capital – was already written down in the 
Rome Treaty. The integration project formed, relatively successfully, a single goods and 
capital market. Currently, the European Commission is undertaking serious efforts to tackle 
the problems preventing an effective single services market. The free movement of persons is 
de facto the black sheep in the integration process as (cross-border) migration is still very low. 
The 15 members of the European Union constitute a large set of diverse regions. They differ 
in labour market outcomes such as unemployment rates and wages but also in industry 
structure (Midelfart-Knarvik et al., 2000). This makes Europe relatively vulnerable to 
asymmetric shocks (Bayoumi & Eichengreen, 1993), which might be amplified by a better 
functioning of the single market (Krugman, 1993).
1 
Labour mobility can play a role in adjusting to shocks. In a single currency area, the 
adjustment to asymmetric shocks can take place via price or quantity adjustment or via fiscal 
transfers. In particular, real wages ought to be flexible, fiscal redistribution should be of 
sufficient size, or capital, labour and income flows should be sufficiently responsive to 
disturbances.
2 In the EU fiscal redistribution is relatively unimportant compared to the US, 
while wage flexibility is known to be notoriously low. It is not clear, however, that the role 
for labour mobility is or can be important in absorbing short-term shocks. Hence, for the 
largest part of the analysis we focus on long-term or permanent shocks. 
Labour mobility can play a role in resolving regional disparities. Unemployment rates as well 
as income per capita differ vastly across regions. Midelfart-Knarvik et al. (2000) show that 
the industry structure is also very diverse across the EU and is becoming even more so. Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (1991) show that per capita incomes tend to converge but that complete 
convergence is still out of sight. Putting these pieces together, it is easy to make the point that 
there is a potential role for labour mobility in resolving regional disparities. Indeed, it is low 
mobility in the presence of large regional disparities that is worrying. Hence what is crucial is 
the responsiveness of labour to regional disparities and, thus, it is important to try to explain 
the responsiveness. This is what this paper sets out to do.  
Closely related to our approach are Decressin and Fatás (1995) and Puhani (2001). 
Decressin and Fatás (1995) use the methodology of the seminal study of Blanchard and Katz 
(1992) to show that the responsiveness of European regional labour mobility is slow and low 
relative to the US. They find that in the short run almost nothing of an idiosyncratic shock is 
absorbed by migration. Also in the long run the role for labour mobility is low compared to 
the US. The major adjustment mechanism is the change in labour participation rates. Changes 
                                                                          
1 This is disputed, however, by Fatás (1998) and Frankel & Rose (1997). 
2 It is not a priori clear that the disappearance of the exchange rate instrument is an unambiguous loss. A lot of 
countries have abstained from using the exchange rate as an instrument for shock adjustment for a long time. 2 | NAHUIS & PARIKH 
in unemployment rates account only for a small portion of the change in regional 
employment. Puhani (2001), using a different methodology, explains net migration rates by 
regional disparities (instead of region-specific shocks). He finds that only unemployment rates 
significantly explain migration. His methodology is closely related to ours. 
This paper focuses on the questions why labour mobility is low in the EU and how it is 
(apparently) possible that it remains low. We explore the issue of labour participation, thrown 
up by Decressin and Fatás (1995), as the most important alternative adjustment mechanism. 
In particular, our analysis contains five contributions to the literature. First, using a 
framework different from Decressin and Fatás we address the question on labour participation 
as an alternative adjustment mechanism for labour mobility in the EU. Second, we examine 
whether labour participation of the young is important or labour participation is important in 
general.
3 Third, we use a more finely disaggregated data-set than Decressin and Fatás and 
Puhani and include more regions. Fourth, we treat the EU regions as a single panel whereas 
Decressin and Fatás and Puhani treat different countries separately. Finally, we introduce 
several new variables in the migration model. That is, we distinguish between long-term 
unemployment and unemployment in general; and we examine whether part-time work is an 
adjustment mechanism that is comparable to labour force participation. 
The paper is organised in six sections. Section 2 presents a theory of net migration. Section 3 
describes the data and discusses data limitations. Section 4 presents the econometric 
estimation based on balanced and unbalanced panel structures of the data. Furthermore it 
draws inferences from the static econometric model applied to 191 regions of EU. Section 5 
formulates a partial adjustment model for the net migration rate. The dynamic model is 
estimated using OLS, Generalised Least Squares and Generalised Method of Moments. The 
estimated adjustment coefficients permit us to study both short-run and long-run responses of 
net migration rates to unemployment, income and other labour market variables. Section 6, 
finally, concludes. 
2.  A theory of net migration 
The role that labour mobility plays in resolving aggregate regional disparities is captured by 
net migration flows.
4 The section sets up a model that is sufficiently flexible to discuss a 
number of different labour market variables. We derive net migration flows by explaining the 
gross flows based on individual (or household) migration decisions. The net migration rate is 
the difference between a region’s immigration and emigration (expressed as the proportion of 
the region’s population). 
2.1 The  model 
To derive migration flows we consider first the decision to emigrate. An individual in region i 
calculates the expected value of supplying labour on the home market, indexed with the 
second i, (Vii) and compares that to the expected value of participating in the alternative 
labour markets (Vij). Thereby, the individual (q) takes into account the cost of leaving the 
region of residence, for example the number of children. We assume that these unobservable 
characteristics are randomly distributed among all potential migrants within each region. 
                                                                          
3 In the empirical specification we use female labour participation. This has more variation, since men more 
often work full time. 
4 Gross flows of workers that are not identical with respect to skill, might be resolving disequilibria on specific 
labour markets. Due to a lack of suitable data, this issue could not be analysed. FACTOR MOBILITY AND REGIONAL DISPARITIES | 3 
 
Among the observables we focus on economic state variables. Having a partner that is 
currently employed might for example raise the cost of emigration. Female labour 
participation rates can serve as a proxy for this. Denote these costs of leaving for individual q 
as Ci,q. Thus an individual migrates if for any region j: 
  q i ij ii C V V , − ≤  (1) 
The average of Ci,q over individuals in a region is denoted Ci and is interpreted as a function 
of labour market variables. Ci equals the willingness of the average individual to leave region 
i.
5 The expected value of supplying labour on the (home or any other) labour market depends 
on the wage and the probability of being matched successfully.
6 Thus, we propose: 
  ? , 0 ) , ( = < = s u j j j ij M M W S U M V  (2) 
where M is the function that indicates the chance of having or obtaining a job in market j and 
W is the wage rate in market j. The subscripts to M denote partial derivatives.
7 Uj is the 
unemployment rate in labour market j and Sj is a vector of factors determining flexibility of 
the labour market. Proxies of the latter are the share of part-time work, wage flexibility and 
the participation rate. The sign of the flexibility factors, S, is unclear. More flexibility, on the 
one hand, increases the matching probability. On the other hand, a region with a flexible 
labour market might not ‘need’ migrants to resolve disequilibria.
8 An individual thus 
emigrates from region i if: 
  [] j j j i i i i W S U M
N j
Min
C W S U M ) , ( ) , (
∈
< +   (3) 
where N is the set of alternative regions. This suggests that a region is more likely to face 
emigration if the cost of leaving is low and if the wage is low. Unemployment encourages 
emigration at two levels: the unemployed are more likely to go as their cost of leaving (C) is 
lower and higher unemployment lowers the probability of obtaining a job in the home region.  
Analogously, an individual that decided to emigrate from region j chooses to go to region i if: 
  [] h h h i i i W S U M
N h
Max
W S U M ) , ( ) , (
∈
<   (4) 
Immigration thus increases in the probability of obtaining a job (for example low 
unemployment or higher wages). In deciding which region to go, Cj, proxied by the labour 
market status of the potential immigrant, does not play a role as it is identical for all 
destination regions. 
Using equation (3) and (4) it follows that net migration (NMi) is explained by:
9 
  i i i i i C W S U M b NM + + = ) , (   (5) 
For some labour market variables the push factors (for unemployed it is less costly to leave) 
and pull factors (a high level of unemployment discourages immigration) work in the same 
                                                                          
5 We ignore, for tractability, the fact that the cost of leaving might depend on the region of destination too.  
6 For simplicity we assume matching rates that are equal for employed and unemployed persons. 
7 Note that by omitting a subscript i to the wage we do not consider discrimination of migrants in the labour 
market. See Ortega (2000) for a discussion on discrimination.  
8 This second interpretation of flexibility goes beyond the narrow analytical set-up presented here. 
9 Note that we use the fact that the terms between brackets are identical for all regions and that these can be 
treated as a constant (b). 4 | NAHUIS & PARIKH 
direction. For other variables it is not a priori clear. Take, for example, labour participation of 
females. On the one hand it increases the cost of leaving a region (Ci increases). On the other 
hand, high female participation in the labour market might proxy labour market flexibility 
which might make a region ‘need’ less migrants.
10 Here time-series testing is needed to shed 
light on the dominating effect.
11 
2.2  Other theoretical considerations 
The discussion above deals with individuals although the relevant decision unit is the 
household. We capture this in the model by taking the cost of leaving into consideration, 
which approximates for having a partner that has a job, etc. Of course, whether or not a family 
has school age children does matter for the household decision. We assume that these factors 
are randomly distributed and hence do not bias our estimates. Bauer and Zimmermann (1995) 
suggest that migration may become a self-perpetuating process, because the costs and risks of 
migration are lowered by social and information networks. The network approach indicates 
that the cost of moving may be substantially reduced for the relatives and friends of migrants 
and this could increase the probability of migration. The network effect of migration hence 
implies that migration induces more migration. We will touch upon this issue by considering 
a dynamic specification of our econometric model. 
Countrywide unemployment levels tend to discourage migration as it makes migration riskier. 
Moreover, credit-market conditions might worsen in recessions making it difficult to finance 
the mobility cost (see Gordon, 1985). That aggregate unemployment affects gross flows 
negatively does not, however, deliver a clear prediction for net flows; hence we do not pursue 
this line here (Pissarides & McMaster, 1990, elaborate on this). 
3.  Data: description and limitations 
We use regional data from Eurostat (2000). From the available regions we select those 
providing the necessary data to construct net migration rates. This provides us with an 
unbalanced panel of 191 regions with time-series of up to 13 years (1983-95). 
Constructing a balanced panel with the time-series dimension unaltered reduces the number of 
regions reduced to 83 (for details on the regions included in both panels, see Appendix A). 
The fact that we use population migration where labour migration is relevant for the labour 
market impact requires some discussion. First, the data do not allow us to distinguish between 
labour migration and population migration. Second, there is evidence that qualitatively 
comparable results are obtained using either labour or population-migration data (see Parikh 
& Van Leuvensteijn, 2002). Finally, systematic biases in the difference between population 
and labour migration (think of a region with a large university) will end up in fixed effects. 
The unsystematic bias is white noise. 
 
                                                                          
10 An alternative view is that labour market flexibility makes a region more attractive. Then the effect on net 
migration would be positive. 
11 We expect that younger people are, on average, much more flexible than older individuals. In the empirical 
analysis we use the age group 25-35. For this group the cost of leaving is low as they commonly do not have 
school-age children (for the highly educated, Mauro and Spilimbergo, 1999, find that the higher educated are 
more mobile). This effect of age does not necessarily dominate the negative matching effect because changes in 
young age female participation in the labour market act as an alternative adjustment mechanism that smooths 
unfavourable regional conditions. FACTOR MOBILITY AND REGIONAL DISPARITIES | 5 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics (balanced panel)
a 
 Mean Std  Dev Minimum Maximum
GDP
b 14311.3 4533.9 5053.1 33734.7
U 8.4 3.9 1.5 25.4
ACTfy   67.6 10.0 32.2 88.7
ACTf   40.8 6.7 22.0 62.4
POP
c 2260.3 1798.6 222.8 11004.3
NM
d   3.0 6.5 ￿ 44 27.0
a The summary statistics are taken from the untransformed variables. 
b GDP per inhabitant at PPPs. 
c In thousands. 
d Multiplied by a thousand. 
 
The explanatory variables for which the information is available are summarised in Table 1 
(Appendix A provides detailed definition for the different variables). As a proxy for the wage 
rate, we use GDP per inhabitant at purchasing power parity (GDP). The spread in GDP per 
inhabitant is large; Thessalia in Greece in 1983 has the lowest income in the panel; 
Schleswig-Holstein in Germany in 1995 has the highest. We use two figures for 
unemployment: those recorded as unemployed, U, and those who are in unemployment for 
more than twelve months, long-term unemployment (Ult). In the balanced panel, however, we 
restrict ourselves to ‘general’ unemployment with the highest being in Campania in Italy 
where a quarter of the labour force is unemployed. Other explanatory variables are: the 
activity rate of females (ACTf) and the activity rate of young females (ACTfy). The 
population data are provided to illustrate the size of the regions. The mean size of a region is 
2.2 million people. The mean rate of migration is 0.003, hence the regions in the sample are, 
as an unweighted average, immigration regions. Hence a region with 2,200,000 inhabitants 
received 6,600 net migrants a year.
12 The mean rate of migration, 0.003, might be low, but it 
is not the same as saying that migration is unimportant, as it is an important factor in 
explaining population changes. 
Figure 1 depicts the average of the absolute value of the net migration rate in the sample. The 
spike around 1989, 1990 is to a considerable extent caused by the German unification.
13 What 
deserves attention is that, despite further steps in the European integration process, the 
migration rate is back to its low rate of the early 1980s. Two issues are important to judge the 
time-series behaviour of the net migration rate: first, what is the magnitude of migration 
compared to population change and second, how big is the incentive to migrate. 
First, saying that the migration rate is low is different to saying that migration is unimportant. 
Figure 2 makes this point. It shows the share that migration contributes to population change. 
Figure 2 depicts the median observation.
14 This median share is roughly 50% to 80% and has 
not returned to the share level observed in the early 1980s. 
 
                                                                          
12 That is: 2,200,000 * 3 / 1000. 
13 The general findings that we present in the next section stand upright when we exclude Germany. 
14 We show the median of migration/population instead of the mean, as the mean is not informative since the 
denominator tends to zero for several observations. 6 | NAHUIS & PARIKH 
Figure 1. Net migration rate over time 
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Figure 2. Contribution of migration to population change 
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Second, the return to the relatively low rates of migration of the 1980s is not worrying as 
such; what matters is whether the rate of migration is low despite high incentives to migrate. 
Figure 3 presents some indicators of the incentives to migrate. The lower line in the figure 
depicts the variance of the log of per capita GDP. The constancy (or, slight increase) indicates 
that the regions in our sample have not converged considerably in the period under 
consideration (see, for a similar finding, Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1991). FACTOR MOBILITY AND REGIONAL DISPARITIES | 7 
 
Figure 3. Variance of expected income and income 
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In Section 2 we argued that the relevant decision variable for migration is the chance of 
obtaining a job multiplied by the wage, ie M(.))W. To proxy this, the upper line shows whether 
(1-U)* logGDP showed convergence; the opposite is true.
15 The low rate of migration 
remains puzzling as the incentives for migration have gone up.
16 Putting some pieces of this 
puzzle together is the issue to which we turn now. 
4.  Econometric estimation and results 
The estimating equation, related to equation (5), is specified as 
i i i i U b W b b MN ε + + + = ln ln 2 1 0  
The interpretation of the estimated coefficients is as follows: a one percent increase in the 
wage rate increases the net migration rate by b1 migrants per 1000 inhabitants, ceteris paribus. 
For the unemployment rate it is slightly more complicated: a one percentage-point increase in 
the unemployment rate increases the net migration rate with b2/U (where U is the relevant 
average unemployment rate) migrants per 1000 inhabitants, ceteris paribus. 
Panel data are a special type of pooled cross-section/time-series data in which the same 
individual units are sampled over time. In our analysis both cross-sectional variation and 
inter-temporal variation can provide useful information. Hence, it may be useful to classify 
variables into one of three types: time-invariant, region-invariant and region-time varying 
variables. The time-invariant variables are constant over time but specific for the cross-
sectional units: think of a pleasant climate in a certain region. The region-invariant variables 
are the same for the cross-sectional units at a given point of time but they vary through time. 
                                                                          
15 The latter finding is robust to the method of computing the variation in expected income. The coefficient of 
variation also produces an upward trend as does this statistic with the level of income (without taking logs). 
16 Appendix B is more elaborate on the convergence issue in our sample. There is evidence for so called β-
convergence. 8 | NAHUIS & PARIKH 
Examples of these would be year-effects including the changes in attitudes towards migration 
from one year to another. The region-time varying variables vary across cross-sectional units 
at a point in time and also exhibit variations through time. Most of the variables in our study 
are region-time-varying variables.
17 
Given this type of data we use four different estimation techniques. The first is the total, 
which is plain OLS on the pooled cross-section data. The second is the within estimation that 
takes into account the regional fixed effects. The focus is then on the time-series dimension in 
the data. The third, between estimation, explores the cross-sectional dimension by using only 
the regional means over time. In most cases we will restrict ourselves to the within 
estimations only. In all cases we restrict the estimated coefficients to be identical across 
regions. The fourth approach is the random effects estimation. All the approaches are used for 
the following model specification:  
t i it it it it where X y η α ε ε β + = + =  
The random effects estimator is preferred over the within (or fixed-effect) estimation if the 
time-invariant region specific variables, i, are uncorrelated with Xit. When the true model is 
the random effects model, OLS will yield consistent estimates of  but the standard errors will 
be underestimated. Hence, we will use the Generalized Least Squares procedure.
18  
The Hausman test tests the null hypothesis of a true Random Effects model. In the presented 
results in the next section, the Hausman test rejects in many cases the random effects model 
given the diversity of regions. Hence the empirical evidence strongly favours fixed effects 
models in a majority of regression specifications. 
4.1 Unbalanced  panel  estimation 
Table 2 reports the results for the basic equations, where we introduce only the 
unemployment rate and the wage proxy. Both variables have the expected signs and are 
significant. The wage proxy is insignificant in the between estimation. Thus, the time-average 
level of GDP does not explain time-averaged migration rates. Only in a time series 
perspective GDP does explain net migration; thus a higher GDP relative to the (common) 
European benchmark, increases the net migration rate. An elaborate interpretation of size of 
the estimated coefficients is postponed to the discussion of the balanced panel estimations. 
On annual data one might suggest that GDP and unemployment of the previous period will 
influence the net migration rate. Migrants might wait one period and thus react to the 
observed GDP and unemployment rates of last period before taking a decision to move to a 
more prosperous region. This is tested using the lagged unemployment rate and GDP 
variables. Columns (III) to (IV) show that the results are very similar to the results in column 
(I). 
 
                                                                          
17 The advantage of panel data comes in a variety of ways: a) it increases the number of observations; b) it adds 
more variability and more information; c) it permits the data to be treated in two dimensions separately provided 
there are enough time periods for which data are available; and d) it enriches econometric specification such that 
we can use a fixed effect and a random effects model.  
18 When there is no uncorrelated region-specific component of variance, the random effects estimator reduces to 
the pooled OLS estimator. The pooled estimate weights all observations equally. The OLS estimator on the 
pooled data does not use the information about heteroscedasticity that can result from repeated observations. The 
random effects estimator is a combination of the between and within estimator with GLS weights. FACTOR MOBILITY AND REGIONAL DISPARITIES | 9 
 
Table 2. Unbalanced panel. Basic estimations. Dependent variable is net migration rate 
(NM)
a 
Variable  (I) Within (II) Between (III) Within  (IV) Between
GDP  4.22
*** 0.14 −   − 
 [6.73] [0.11] −   − 
UN  − 3.55
*** −  3.32
***  
 [6.07] [4.65] −   − 
GDP(-1)  − − 3.19
***  − 0.92
  − − [4.55] [0.64]
UN(-1)  − − −  3.14
***  − 3.76
***
  − − [5.01] [4.90]
R
2 0.44 0.12 0.46  0.13
N 1966 1966 1775  1775
Hausman test ￿
2 (2,2)  9.85 − 6  − 
a Sample period is 1983-95, 191 regions. Absolute t-statistics are given in brackets under the estimates. 
*, 
**, 
and 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10% level, the 5% level, and the 1% level, respectively. ￿
2 (2,2) 
refers to two degress of freedom for each of the two models. 
 
As a next step we introduce the following alternative push and pull factors sequentially in the 
model: 
i i i i i i i ACTf b PARTf b Ult b U b W b b MN ε + + + + + + = ln ln ln ln ln 5 4 3 2 1 0  
To reiterate, based on the discussion in Section 2, we expect both short-term (or ‘regular') as 
well as long-term unemployment to have a negative sign. The expected sign for the other 
labour-market indicators, i.e. part-time work, is not a priori clear. The time-series or within-
region results should shed light on the issue whether changing labour-participation rates act 
more as an impediment for emigration than as a discouragement for immigration. There is no 
clear prediction for the cross-section (between) estimation. 
Table 3 shows the results for the random effects estimation.
19 First, we introduce the long-
term unemployment rate instead of the ‘regular’ unemployment rate. Long-term 
unemployment turns up highly significant. The significance of the GDP factor is drastically 
reduced (compare with column (I) in Table 2). This suggests that changes in the rate of long-
term unemployment provide a more powerful explanatory factor for net migration than the 
regular unemployment rate. To test for this, we include the share of long-term unemployment 
in total unemployment along with the total unemployment rate; this term is, however, 
insignificant (column (II)).  
When we turn our attention to column (I) in Table 4.2 and compare that to column (I) in the 
previous table we can infer something about the different reactions to a percentage point 
increase in the long-term unemployment rate and the ‘regular’ unemployment rate. The 
estimated coefficients differ considerably but the responsiveness of net migration to both 
                                                                          
19 The choice to present the random effects model depends on the fact that the null-hypothesis of a random-
effects model is not rejected. In the remainder, both when we report the random effects model as well as when 
we report the fixed effects model, we will show the Hauseman test for the random effects model. 10 | NAHUIS & PARIKH 
types of unemployment turns out not to differ. A one percentage-point increase in the 
‘regular’ unemployment rate causes a change in the net migration rate of 0.00044 (that is  
-4.22/1000 divided by the sample mean of 9.49), ceteris paribus. For long-term 
unemployment we find 0.00041 (that is -1.91/1000 divided by the sample mean of 4.56), 
ceteris paribus.  
The final column in Table 3 reports a regression including the share of females that work part-
time. Part-time work is not significant and hence does not seem to act as a cost to emigration 
or a substitute for adjustment. It might be the case that both play a role and that the effects 
therefore cancel out. 
Table 3. Unbalanced panel. Dependent variable is net migration rate (NM)
a 
Variable  (I) Random (II) Random (III) Random
GDP 1.59
* 2.16
*** 3.65
***
 [1.79] [2.44] [4.91]
UN  − 3.48
*** − 4.29
***
 [6.73] [8.22]
UNlt  − 1.91
***
 [5.32]
UNltshare 0.65
 [0.90]
PARTf  0.2
  [0.38]
R
2 0.11 0.13 0.13
N 1435 1435 1504
Hausman test ￿
2(2,3,3) 2.78 7.58 8.64
a Sample period is 1983-1995, 191 regions. Absolute t-statistics are given in parentheses under the estimates. 
*, 
**, and 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10% level, the 5% level, and the 1% level, respectively. ￿
2(2,3,3) 
refers to 2, 3 and 3 degrees of freedom respectively for each of the three models. 
 
The next section will refine the inferences with the balanced panel. 
4.2  The balanced panel and female labour participation 
Table 4 reports the within results for the balanced panel. These basic results are analogous to 
those obtained with the unbalanced panel. Again GDP and unemployment explain net 
migration rates in the expected way. Almost 45% of the time series variation is explained by 
these two variables. How sensitive is migration to unemployment and GDP? A one percent 
increase in GDP increases the migration rate by 0.005 percentage points ceteris paribus. A FACTOR MOBILITY AND REGIONAL DISPARITIES | 11 
 
one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate decreases the migration rate 
(increases out-migration) by -0.00095 percentage-points (-8.02/1000 divided by the sample 
mean of 8.4), ceteris paribus. Hence in a region with 2.2 million inhabitants, 2100 people 
leave when the unemployment rate increases with one percentage point (the latter is an 
increase in unemployment by 22,000 people), other things remaining the same. An alternative 
interpretation of these numbers is that a permanent adverse shock is absorbed for over 90% by 
unemployment changes and 10% by net migration. In the US these numbers are 30% and 65% 
respectively, in the short run. In the long run, the shock is entirely absorbed by migration 
(Blanchard and Katz, 1992). Our methodology differs however from Blanchard and Katz; 
Decressin and Fatás (1995), employing the Blanchard-Katz methodology, confirm our 
finding. They argue that changes in labour participation absorb shocks. 
In columns (II) and (III) labour-participation rates are added to the specification (the 
alternative adjustment factors introduced by Decressin and Fatás).
20 
Table 4. Balanced panel. Dependent variable is net migration rate (NM)
a 
Variable  (I) Within  (II) Within (III) Within
(IV) Within 
with  
differeces () in 
ACTfy 
(V) Within 
with 
differeces () in 
ACTy
GDP 5.08
*** 7.15
*** 6.38
*** 4.53
*** 4.45
***
 [6.86]  [7.89] [7.00] [5.21]  [5.10]
UN  − 8.02
***  − 8.03
*** − 8.13
*** − 7.68
***  − 7.67
***
 [10.08]  [10.17] [10.22] [8.92]  [9.02]
ACTfy (∆ ACTfy)    − 11.91
*** 6.56 
   [3.90] [1.57] 
ACTf (∆ ACTf)    − 8.27 
**  0.005
   [2.43]   [0.002]
R
2 0.45  0.45 0.45 0.52  0.46
N 1066  1066 1066 984  984
Hausman test 
￿
2(2,3,3)  17.98 23.24 22.04 15.14  11.81
a Sample period is 1983-95, 82 regions. Absolute t-statistics are given in parentheses under the estimates. 
*, 
**, 
and 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10% level, the 5% level, and the 1% level, respectively. ￿
2(2,3,3) 
refers to 2, 3 and 3 degrees of freedom for each of the three models, respectively. 
The estimation shows that young female labour participation affects net migration 
significantly negative (see column (II)). Overall female labour participation is also significant 
(column (III)). Both effects are of similar magnitude and hence there is no evidence for the 
‘cost of leaving’-effect of female labour participation we discern; discouragement of 
                                                                          
20 Recall that we are unable to use long-term unemployment and part-time participation data as that would 
considerably reduce the sample size. 12 | NAHUIS & PARIKH 
emigration. A one percentage-point increase in female labour participation decreases net 
migration by approximately 400 (in a 2.2 milj. inhabitants region).
21 When we introduce both 
female labour participation variables (ACTf and ACTfy) in the regression we find that the 
ACTfy is significant only. With the static estimation this is the only evidence present for the 
discouragement of emigration by the level of female labour participation.
22 Summarising the 
results with the level of female labour participation as explanatory variable: we find that 
(young) female labour participation affects net migration negatively. The explanation for this 
result is not entirely clear; female labour participation might act as an alternative labour-
market adjustment mechanism that makes immigration to a region with high female 
participation unattractive.  
To assess the role of labour participation in the adjustment process to idiosyncratic shocks the 
specifications in columns (II) and (III) tell a puzzling story: a high level of female labour 
participation lowers a region’s net migration rate. A more direct test for the hypothesis that 
female labour participation acts as an alternative adjustment process is to introduce the 
participation variables in first differences. Columns (IV) and (V) show that the differenced 
variables enter insignificantly. In the next section we argue that these findings are not robust. 
We show that the results drastically change when estimating a dynamic migration model. 
5.  A dynamic panel approach: Allowing for ‘network effects’ 
Network effects can be important, as we suggested in Section 2. To account for these 
mechanisms we employ a dynamic panel approach in this section. The advantage of the 
dynamic panel approach is that it allows for lags in the behaviour of agents and as we 
estimate a reduced form it can be consistent with various hypotheses based on adjustment 
costs. One of the interpretations is that a fixed proportional adjustment is achieved in one or 
two periods and that the remainder is spread over time. The smaller the adjustment 
coefficient, the longer it takes to reach equilibrium or the desired level of net migration. We 
propose a model where the dynamics are introduced through lagged dependent and exogenous 
variables.  
The model we estimate is first-differenced and dynamic version of the model in the previous 
section:  
it i it it
it it it it it it
MN MN
ACTf b U b U b GDP b GDP b MN
η α λ λ + + +
+ ∆ + + + + =
− −
− −
2 2 1 1
5 1 4 3 1 2 1 ln ln ln ln ln
 
Hence, all variables are defined as before but now we use first differences. We assume that a 
random sample of N regions’ time series (NMi1..........NMiT) is available. T is small and N is 
large. The it is assumed to have finite moments in particular E(it)=E(it is) =0 for t￿s.We 
assume lack of serial correlation but not necessarily independence over time. With these 
assumptions  NM lagged two period or more could be valid instruments in the equations 
estimated in first differenced form.  
We report all one step estimates based on Arellano-Bond procedure (1991). Two-step and 
other estimates can be obtained from the authors. Different specifications are tried and the 
important results are shown in Table 5. 
                                                                          
21 A one percent increase in the ‘young’ female participation rate causes a fall in the net migration rate of 
0.00018 (that is -11.91/1000 divided by the sample mean of 67.57), ceteris paribus. For the participation rate of 
all females we find 0.00020 (that is -8.27/1000 divided by the sample mean of 40.77), ceteris paribus. 
22 We do not report this estimate to save space. It is available on request. FACTOR MOBILITY AND REGIONAL DISPARITIES | 13 
 
Table 5. Net migration equations GMM estimates. Dependent variable is net migration rate 
(NM). All variables are in first diffences 
 (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV)  (V) 
Name of variable  Model with 2 
lags 
Model with 
one lag and 
without lact 
Model with 
one lag and 
without lacty 
Model without 
lags and 
without lact 
Model without 
lags and 
without lacty 
NMR(-1) 
0.2186
***
(5.19)
0.2116
***
(5.11)
0.2248
***
(5.34)
0.2302
*** 
(5.65) 
0.2292
***
(5.47)
NMR(-2) 
0.0475
(1.21)
0.0405
(1.04)
0.0463
(1.18)
0.0246 
(0.63) 
0.0252
(0.65)
UNEM  − 7.6912
***
(4.02)
− 7.7563
***
(4.06)
− 7.7578
***
(4.07)
− 5.7012
*** 
(3.07) 
− 5.7206
***
(3.09)
UNEM(-1)  − 1.010
(0.59)
− 1.0913
*
(1.7113)
− 1.2508
(0.73)
 
GDP 
24.031
***
(2.81)
22.8960
***
(2.69)
23.4987
***
(2.75)
4.3943 
(0.55) 
4.2771
(0.59)
GDP(-1)  − 37.9870
***
(4.49)
− 38.8472
***
(4.61)
 
−37.243***
 
(4.40)
 
∆LACTY  − 7.1217
(1.26)
− 9.1844
**
(2.05)
− 0.0780 
(0.02) 
∆LACTY(-1)  − 7.3621
(1.34)
− 12.4298
***
(2.87)
 
∆LACT  − 5.0559
(0.69)
− 10.9780
*
(1.88)
 
1.0015
(0.19)
∆LACT(-1)  − 11.2918
(1.58)
− 17.0655
***
(3.02)
 
Constant 
0.8104
(1.04)
0.9376
**
(1.90)
0.7896
(1.60)
− 0.2624 
(0.60) 
− 0.2545
(0.58)
Sargan Test ￿ 2 
(52 DF) 
69.83 67.48 71.60
‡ 74.41
‡ 74.15
‡
TEST Second Order 
AC  1.13 1.15 1.38 1.59 1.63
Wald ￿ 2  135.38 133.63 132.47 91.22  91.54
‡Test of overidentifying restrictions violated. 
Figures in parentheses are the asymptotic z-ratios where z-statistic follows a normal distribution. *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10% level, the 5% level, and the 1% level, respectively. 
Time dummies were included in each equation to begin with but because of collinearity, they were eliminated in 
subsequent run. 
 
The GMM estimates reported are all one-step excepting the Sargan test which refers to two-
step estimates. Two-step estimates can be obtained from the authors. The second-order 
autocorrelation test does not indicate serial correlation on all first-differenced variables. The 
Wald statistic is a test of the joint significance of the independent variables asymptotically 14 | NAHUIS & PARIKH 
distributed as χ2 (K) under the null of no relationship, where K is the number of coefficients 
estimated. We present the results of five estimated models as there is a problem of 
multicollinearity among the changes in young female participation rate and overall female 
participation rate. The general model uses two lags in the dependent variable and one lag in 
all explanatory variables. Results with two lags in all explanatory variables can be obtained 
from the authors. The long-run impact of unemployment on the net migration rate is negative 
and similarly with the changes in female labour participation rate and young female labour 
participation rate. Hence increases in the female labour participation rate indeed lower the net 
migration rate in the dynamic model. These signs confirm that female labour participation 
changes can act as a shock absorber against demand shocks.  
Columns (II) and (III) present the results for the variables on changes in female labour 
participation rates. These also support the negative impact of female labour participation rates 
on migration rate. Other regression parameters do not change in relation to the general 
model.
23 
To summarise, a dynamic specification of the migration model confirms the hypothesis that 
changes in (female) labour participation act as an alternative adjustment mechanism. 
6. Conclusions 
In this study, two simple models are used to study European population migration. Changes in 
economic activity or in unemployment affect the regional population due to migration. This 
aspect is captured both in the panel study of 82 regions and in the unbalanced panel study of 
191 regions. For an average region (with 2.2 million inhabitants, take Noord Brabant in the 
Netherlands or Hannover in Germany), a one percentage-point increase in unemployment 
induces 2,100 persons extra to leave. A one percent increase in the per capita income induces 
an inflow of 11,000 persons. It is clear that mobility is low, especially when it comes to 
unemployment differences.  
The important aspect of this study is the sustenance of low labour mobility for a long period 
of time despite regional disparities. We show that this can partly be explained through the 
adjustment in labour market variables, other than unemployment rates. In this respect, female 
participation and participation of young females mitigates the adverse effects of low labour 
mobility. Hence, using a different approach we have a finding related to the Decressin and 
Fatás (1995) finding. Part-time employment does not play an analogous role.  
 
                                                                          
23 All these results are free of second order serial correlation on first differenced data. Also, if the data have a 
unit root problem this has been taken care of by using the first differences. The results presented in columns (IV) 
and (V) do not use any lags of the explanatory variables and Wald test yields a low value of the fit and both 
changes in labour participation rates and GDP have very low asymptotic z-values due to lack of adequate 
dynamics. The adjustment coefficient in all these models is near 0.7339 (in the most general model) and varying 
between (0.7389 to 0.7479 in columns (II) and (III)). This suggests that the despite low labour mobility when the 
female labour participation is taken into account the adjustment to the desired level of net migration is achieved 
within 1.36 years.  | 15 
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Appendix A. Data 
Regions in the panel 
We use regional data at the Nuts 2 level from Eurostat (2000). Nuts 2 (nomenclature of 
territorial units for statistics) subdivides the territory of the European Community into 211 
regions. Two regions at the Nuts 2 level are identical to countries: Luxembourg and Denmark. 
We use data on population changes and economic variables, like GDP, and labour market 
data, as unemployment and participation rates. 
From the available regions we selected the regions which provided the necessary data to 
construct net migration rates.
24 This provides us with an unbalanced panel of 191 regions with 
time series up to 13 years (1983-95). 
From the unbalanced panel we constructed a balanced panel with the time-series dimension 
unaltered and the number of regions reduced to 82. The following regions are in the 
unbalanced panel. The balanced panel contains the regions with a (B). 
Région Bruxelles-capitale/Brussels hoofdstad gewest (B), Antwerpen (B), Limburg (B) , 
Oost-Vlaanderen (B), Vlaams Brabant, West-Vlaanderen (B), Brabant Wallon, Hainaut (B), 
Liège (B), Luxembourg (B), Namur (B), Denmark (B), Stuttgart (B), Karlsruhe (B), Freiburg 
(B), Tübingen (B), Oberbayern (B), Niederbayern (B), Oberpfalz (B), Oberfranken (B), 
Mittelfranken (B), Unterfranken (B), Schwaben (B), Berlin, Brandenburg, Bremen (B), 
Hamburg (B), Darmstadt (B), Gießen (B), Kassel (B), Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, 
Braunschweig (B), Hannover (B), Lüneburg (B), Weser-Ems (B), Düsseldorf (B), Köln (B), 
Münster (B), Detmold (B), Arnsberg (B), Koblenz (B), Trier (B), Rheinhessen-Pfalz (B), 
Saarland (B), Schleswig-Holstein (B), Thüringen, Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki, Kentriki 
Makedonia, Dytiki Makedonia, Thessalia (B), Ipeiros, Ionia Nisia, Dytiki Ellada, Sterea 
Ellada, Peloponnisos, Attiki, Voreio Aigaio, Notio Aigaio, Kriti (B), Galicia, Principado de 
Asturias, Cantabria, Pais Vasco, Comunidad Foral de Navarra, La Rioja, Aragón, Comunidad 
de Madrid, Castilla y León, Castilla-la Mancha, Extremadura, Cataluña, Comunidad 
Valenciana, Baleares, Andalucia, Murcia, Ceuta y Melilla (ES), Canarias (ES), Île de France 
(B), Champagne-Ardenne (B), Picardie (B), Haute-Normandie (B), Centre (B), Basse-
Normandie (B), Bourgogne (B), Nord - Pas-de-Calais (B), Lorraine (B), Alsace (B), Franche-
Comté (B), Pays de la Loire (B), Bretagne (B), Poitou-Charentes (B), Aquitaine (B), Midi-
Pyrénées (B), Limousin (B), Rhône-Alpes (B), Auvergne (B), Languedoc-Roussillon (B), 
Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur, Corse, Piemonte (B), Valle d'Aosta (B), Liguria, Lombardia 
(B), Trentino-Alto Adige (B), Veneto (B), Friuli-Venezia Giulia (B), Emilia-Romagna (B), 
Toscana (B), Umbria (B), Marche (B), Lazio (B), Abruzzo (B), Molise (B), Campania (B), 
Puglia (B), Basilicata (B), Calabria (B), Sicilia (B), Sardegna (B), Luxembourg (B), 
Groningen, Friesland, Drenthe, Overijssel, Gelderland, Flevoland, Utrecht, Noord-Holland, 
Zuid-Holland, Zeeland, Noord-Brabant, Limburg (NL), Burgenland, Niederösterreich, Wien, 
Kärnten, Steiermark, Oberösterreich, Salzburg, Tirol, Vorarlberg, Norte, Centro (P), Lisboa e 
Vale do Tejo, Alentejo, Algarve, Açores (PT), Madeira (PT), Stockholm, Östra 
Mellansverige, Sydsverige, Norra Mellansverige, Mellersta Norrland, Övre Norrland, Tees 
Valley and Durham, Northumberland, Tyne and Wear, Cumbria, Cheshire, Greater 
Manchester, Lancashire, Merseyside, East Riding and North Lincolnshire, North Yorkshire, 
South Yorkshire, West Yorkshire, Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire, Leicestershire, Rutland 
and Northants, Lincolnshire, Herefordshire, Worcestershire and Warks, Shropshire and 
Staffordshire, West Midlands, East Anglia, Bedfordshire, Hertfordshire, Essex, Inner London, 
                                                                          
24 We left out the four French overseas departments a priori. FACTOR MOBILITY AND REGIONAL DISPARITIES | 17 
 
Outer London, Berkshire, Bucks and Oxfordshire, Surrey, East and West Sussex, Hampshire 
and Isle of Wight, Kent, Gloucestershire, Wiltshire and North Somerset, Dorset and Somerset, 
Cornwall and Isles of Scilly, Devon, West Wales and The Valleys, East Wales, North Eastern 
Scotland, Eastern Scotland, South Western Scotland, Highlands and Islands, Northern Ireland 
Definitions of the variables 
GDP  Log of gross domestic product per inhabitant at Purchasing Power Parities at NUTS 
level 2. 
The following data are the results of a survey. The survey refers exclusively to private 
households. The labour force (or active population or working population) was defined as 
comprising persons in employment and the unemployed. All those persons who are not 
classified as employed or unemployed are defined as inactive. Activity rates represent the 
labour force as a percentage of the population of working age (15 years or more for the 
post-1991 series, 14 years or more for the series between 1983 and 1991).  
ACTf  Log of activity rates of females (19/11/1998) 
ACTfy  Log of activity rates of females aged between 25 and 35 years related to the 
corresponding total population 
PARTf  Log of the share of working females that has a part-time job 
Unemployed persons are those who, during the reference period of the interview, were aged 
15 years or over, without work, available for work within the next two weeks and had used an 
active method of seeking work at some time during the previous four weeks. 
U  Log of unemployment rates at NUTS level 3 (11/10/1999)25 
Ult  Log of long-term unemployment; those who are in unemployment for more than 12 
consecutive months. (26/07/1999). 
The following data are not used directly in the estimation but to construct net migration rates. 
Pop  Population at 1st January  
Births Live  births 
Deaths Deaths 
The data on migration rates are derived from population changes that are not explained by 
births and deaths. The figures thus constructed report the difference between immigration and 
emigration. The immigrant either resided in a different region within the same country, a 
region in some other EU country or some non-EU country. The net change in population due 
to migration to offset region-specific shocks is relevant. The source of the migrants is 
(economically) not relevant. The information on gross flows between regions would facilitate 
the analysis of different push and pull factors within an economy. Such information is, 
however, not available between regions of the EU economies. 
 
                                                                          
25 Latest update by Eurostat. | 18 
Appendix B. Convergence 
We elaborate in this appendix on the convergence issue thrown up in the main text.  
Note that a necessary condition for the existence of sigma convergence is beta convergence. 
Poor regions can grow faster than rich ones without cross-sectional dispersion falling over 
time. We find that -convergence indeed occurs. This, however, leaves the results in the main 
text unaffected. Barro (1996) quoting the iron law of Summers indicates that if each year the 
poor region adjusts to the rich regions by 2% per annum then the beta convergence can be 
regarded to be strong and significant. We used the data of 82 regions over 1983-95 period and 
found that overall the regression coefficient of growth on per capita income was -0.029, 
negative and highly significant in our sample. Our tests on sigma convergence indicated that 
the observed variance in per capita income did not show a decline from year to year for a 
sample of 82 regions. Our reservation on sigma convergence is that it should be conditional 
sigma convergence rather than unconditional sigma convergence. ABOUT ENEPRI 
The European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes (ENEPRI) is composed of leading socio-
economic research institutes in practically all EU member states and candidate countries that are 
committed to working together to develop and consolidate a European agenda of research. ENEPRI was 
launched in 2000 by the Brussels-based Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), which provides 
overall coordination for the initiative.  
While the European construction has made gigantic steps forward in the recent past, the European 
dimension of research seems to have been overlooked. The provision of economic analysis at the 
European level, however, is a fundamental prerequisite to the successful understanding of the 
achievements and challenges that lie ahead. ENEPRI aims to fill this gap by pooling the research efforts 
of its different member institutes in their respective areas of specialisation and to encourage an explicit 
European-wide approach. 
ENEPRI is composed of the following member institutes: 
CASE  Center for Social and Economic Research, Warsaw, Poland 
CEBR  Centre for Economic and Business Research, Copenhagen, Denmark 
CEPII  Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales, Paris, France 
CEPS  Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, Belgium 
CERGE-EI  Centre for Economic Research and Graduate Education, Charles University, Prague, 
Czech Republic 
CPB  Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, The Hague, The Netherlands 
DIW  Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin, Germany 
ESRI  Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, Ireland 
ETLA  Research Institute of the Finnish Economy, Helsinki, Finland 
FEDEA  Fundacion de Estudios de Economia Aplicada, Madrid, Spain 
FPB  Belgian Federal Planning Bureau, Brussels, Belgium 
IE-BAS Institute  of  Economics,  Bulgarian  Acadamy of Sciences, Sofia, Bulgaria 
IE-LAS  Institute of Economics, Latvian Academy of Sciences, Riga, Latvia 
IER  Institute for Economic Research, Ljubljana, Slovenia 
IHS  Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria 
ISAE  Istituto di Studi e Analisi Economica, Rome, Italy 
ISCTE  Instituto Superior de Ciências do Trabalho e da Empresa, Lisbon, Portugal 
ISWE-SAS  Institute for Slovak and World Economy, Bratislava, Slovakia 
NEI  New Economy Institute, Vilnius, Lithuania 
NIER  National Institute of Economic Research, Stockholm, Sweden 
NIESR  National Institute for Economic and Social Research, London, UK 
NOBE  Niezalezny Osrodek Bana Ekonomicznych, Lodz, Poland 
PRAXIS  Center for Policy Studies, Tallinn, Estonia 
RCEP  Romanian Centre for Economic Policies, Bucharest, Romania 
TÁRKI  Social Research Centre, Budapest, Hungary 
This ENEPRI Working Paper series aims at making the research undertaken by the member 
institutes or in the context of special ENEPRI events known to a wide public. Unless otherwise 
indicated, the views expressed are attributable only to the author in a personal capacity and not to 
any institution with which he or she is associated. 
ENEPRI publications are partially funded by the European Commission under its Fifth 
Framework Programme - contract no. HPSE-CT-1999-00004. 
European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes 
c/o Centre for European Policy Studies 
Place du Congrès 1 ▪ 1000 Brussels ▪ Tel: 32(0) 229.39.11 ▪ Fax: 32(0) 219.41.51 
Website: http//:www.enepri.org ▪ E-mail: info@enepri.org 